We analyze sequential bargaining in general political and economic environments, where proposers are recognized according to a random recognition rule and a proposal is implemented if it passes under an arbitrary voting rule. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium proposals in structural and preference parameters, and core equivalence under certain conditions.
Introduction
One of the central findings in the spatial model of social choice is that in two or more dimensions the majority rule core, consisting of those alternatives unbeaten in pairwise majority comparisons, is empty for "most" profiles of individual preferences.
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This result extends beyond majority rule to include almost all voting rules (short of ones such as dictatorship and unanimity), depending on a critical dimension of the policy space. Non-emptiness can be obtained by taking the transitive closure of the majority (or other) "social preference" relation -the resulting choice set is called the "top cycle" and consists of those alternatives that are socially preferred directly or indirectly, through a chain of preferred alternatives, to all others. But the top cycle often comprises the entire space of alternatives.
3
As the basis for a general positive model of collective decision making, therefore, simply invoking majority (or some other) rule is not sufficient to generate a useful prediction for many situations; rather, additional description and analysis of the underlying decision process is required.
In this paper, we assume that the decision process takes the form of bargaining. Specifically, we analyze bargaining among two or more agents who must select an alternative from a compact, convex subset of multidimensional Euclidean space. Agents' preferences are represented by continuous and concave utility functions but are otherwise quite arbitrary; thus, besides the classic spatial model of politics, we admit "divide the dollar" problems, exchange economies, and public goods economies (with or without private goods). In common with most of the bargaining literature, we model the decision process as one of discrete time and infinite horizon, where each period a single proposal is made and is either accepted (thereby stopping the process) or rejected. Agents may or may not discount future utility, and discount factors are allowed to vary among the agents. In contrast to the models of Rubinstein (1982) and others, the identity of the proposer does not alternate in a fixed sequence; rather, in the manner of Binmore (1987) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , the proposer is randomly selected, or "recognized," in each period. The recognition probabilities are time-invariant but otherwise unconstrained. In contrast to the models of Binmore, who assumes unanimity rule, and Baron and Ferejohn, who assume majority rule, passage of a proposal requires the assent of one from a collection of "decisive coalitions." This collection is time-invariant and is arbitrary save for the minimal conditions of non-emptiness and monotonicity.
We prove the existence of stationary "no delay" equilibria, in which proposals and voting decisions are independent of the time period and history of the game, and where the first proposal is always accepted. Further, we show that when discount factors are all less than one, delay cannot occur in any stationary equilibrium. Our existence result requires that agents be allowed to mix over their proposals; however, for a restricted class of environments we prove the existence of pure strategy stationary equilibria. The sufficient conditions for pure strategy existence turn out to be well-known conditions sufficient for non-emptiness of the core of the voting rule: we can assume either that the policy space is one-dimensional (in which case, under majority rule, the core consists of the median policy or policies) or that there is a privileged group (an "oligarchy") with the power to pass a proposal, each member of which possesses a veto. As a special case of the latter assumption, we obtain pure strategy equilibria under unanimity rule. We also provide a two-dimensional, three-person, majority rule example with impatient agents where multiple equilibrium payoffs arise, thereby precluding any universal uniqueness result. Finally, we show that the set of equilibrium outcomes varies upper hemicontinuously in the recognition probabilities and the agents' discount factors, as well as in various utility-specific parameters (e.g., ideal points in the case of quadratic utilities).
We next turn to the relationship between the equilibrium outcomes in the bargaining game and the core outcomes (if any) of the underlying voting rule as described by the set of decisive coalitions. We show that when the agents are perfectly patient and utility functions are strictly quasi-concave, equivalence of stationary equilibrium outcomes and core outcomes obtains if the policy space is one-dimensional or if some agent possesses a veto, a condition weaker than the existence of an oligarchy but also known to be sufficient for non-emptiness of the core. In both cases, our result gives a noncooperative story for how outcomes in the core can be realized; in the former case, our bargaining model provides an alternative to Black's (1958) model of committee decision-making and to Downs's (1957) model of competition between political parties, both of which also predict the median policy. Using our upper hemicontinuity result, we conclude that if preferences are "close" to admitting a core and agents are sufficiently patient, then the outcomes of the bargaining process will be "close" to core outcomes; and if there is a unique core outcome, then all equilibrium outcomes will be close to one another as well. Thus, we offer a result on the robustness of core outcomes, an issue that has not previously received rigorous treatment. On the other hand, we also provide a two-dimensional, four-person, majority rule example in which noncore outcomes exist despite the non-emptiness of the core, thereby precluding any universal core equivalence result.
In related work, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) analyze a model in which the alternatives are divisions of a "dollar," agents have selfish preferences, and majority rule is used. Where they assume utility equal to amount of the dollar received, Harrington (1989 Harrington ( , 1990a extends the model to allow for risk aversion; and Calvert and Dietz (1996) allow for externalities in consumption of the dollar. Baron (1991) examines the case of a two-dimensional set of alternatives, three voters with quadratic preferences, and voting by majority rule. Winter (1996) analyzes the divide the dollar problem assuming at least one agent has a veto, focusing on the advantage of veto players over others; McCarty (1998) takes up the same subject, allowing for variable veto power across agents. Jackson and Moselle (1998) consider the case in which a one-dimensional public decision is selected along with a division of a dollar using majority rule; they investigate the nature of coalitions "formed" in equilibrium. Merlo and Wilson (1995) study the divide the dollar problem under unanimity rule, allowing the size of the dollar to change stochastically over time and generating (efficient) equilibrium delay as a consequence. They also prove the uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs.
Other work on bargaining and the core stems from Selten's (1981) model in which a proposal to a coalition consists of a vector of payoffs "feasible" for the coalition. Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta (1993) analyze a transferable utility game with discounting and a fixed "protocol" describing the order of proposers and respondents, with the first "rejector" becoming the new proposer. They show how delay is possible even in stationary equilibria, and they provide conditions under which no delay occurs. Moldovanu and Winter (1995) analyze a non-transferable utility game with no discounting and with a similar "rejector becomes proposer" feature, and they prove an equivalence between the core and stationary "order independent" equilibrium outcomes. Okada (1996) studies a transferable utility game with equal discount factors and a random recognition rule with equal recognition probabilities, showing that no delay occurs in equilibrium and providing conditions sufficient for the existence of efficient equilibria as the common discount factor goes to one.
The Model
Let X ⊆ d denote a non-empty, compact, convex set of alternatives, with d ≥ 1. Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents, n ≥ 2, and assume each i ∈ N has preferences described by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u i : X → . We assume throughout that each u i is continuous and concave and that u i (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X; moreover, we assume there is some x ∈ X such that, for all i ∈ N , u i (x) > 0. We describe an additional restriction, required for some of our results, at the end of section. The voting rule is given by a collection D ⊆ 2 N \ {∅} of coalitions, called decisive. 4 We assume that D is non-empty and monotonic: C ∈ D and C ⊆ C imply C ∈ D. (Together these two assumptions imply N ∈ D.) Save for Section 5, we do not assume that D is proper:
The timing of the interaction is as follows: (a) at t = 1, 2, . . ., agent i ∈ N is recognized with probability ρ i , where ρ = (ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n ) ∈ ∆, the unit simplex in n ; (b) when recognized, i makes a proposal p t i ∈ X; (c) all j ∈ N simultaneously vote to either accept or reject the proposal; if {j ∈ N | j accepts } ∈ D, then the proposal p t i is the chosen alternative and the game ends; otherwise, the process moves to period t + 1 and it repeated. If x ∈ X is accepted in period t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, i's payoff is given by δ
, where we implicitly assume here that the status quo (the outcome prevailing in the absence of agreement) has utility zero; and by our normalization of utilities, it follows that the alternatives in X are unanimously weakly preferred to the status quo.
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If no alternative is ever accepted, each agent receives a utility of zero.
Complete information of preferences, the structure of the game form, etc. is assumed throughout. A history of length l in the game describes all that has transpired in the first l periods (who the previous proposers were, what they proposed, how agents voted) as well as whether in the current period we stand prior to the proposer being recognized, after such recognition but prior to the proposal being made, or after the proposal but prior to the vote. Therefore, in general a strategy for an agent would be a mapping specifying her intended action (what to propose, how to vote) as a function of all histories of all lengths. Since our focus in this paper is only on equilibria in stationary strategies, we avoid unneeded generality and provide a formal definition only of such strategies. A (pure) stationary strategy for i ∈ N consists of a proposal p i ∈ X offered anytime i is recognized; and a measurable decision rule r i : X → {accept, reject}, or equivalently an acceptance set
It turns out that mixtures over proposals are required for our most general existence result, so let P(X) denote the set of Borel probability measures on X and endow P(X) with the topology of weak convergence. Given measurable Y ⊆ X, let P(Y ) denote the subset of probability measures on X that place probability one on Y . Let π i ∈ P(X) denote a mixed stationary proposal for i, and let π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ) denote a profile of mixed stationary proposals. A mixed stationary strategy for i is a pair σ i = (π i , A i ), and we let σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) denote a profile of mixed stationary strategies. It is important to note that randomization takes place before voting: the agents know which alternative has been proposed at the time they cast their votes.
Given a mixed stationary proposal π i for agent i, let S(π i ) denote the support of π i . For a profile σ in which agents use mixed stationary proposals
denote the ex ante expected value of the agents' proposals. Given a profile of mixed stationary proposals with acceptance sets (A 1 , . . . , A n ) and given C ⊆ N , define the set describes what would happen if current proposal were rejected. To formalize these conditions, note first that any strategy profile σ defines in an obvious (if notationally dense) manner a probability distribution over the outcome space (X × {1, 2, . . .}) ∪ {∅}, and with it an expected utility v i (σ) for each i ∈ N as evaluated at the beginning of the game; by stationarity this is also i's continuation value throughout the game, i.e., her expected utility as evaluated next period if the current period's proposal is rejected. In a no-delay stationary equilibrium, we can write the agent i's continuation value as
Formally, we require that the agents' proposals satisfy sequential rationality and that their acceptance sets satisfy weak dominance, with the latter eliminating nasty equilibria in which, for instance, under majority rule everyone accepts x ∈ X independently of preferences. The equilibrium condition on the acceptance sets is that
for all i ∈ N .
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As for proposals, if A is non-empty then agent i, when recognized as proposer, either chooses utility-maximizing outcomes from within A or chooses an outcome that will be rejected, thereby generating a payoff of δ i v i (σ). Thus, the equilibrium condition on proposals is that, for all i ∈ N , 6 Baron and Kalai (1993) refer to such strategies as "stage-undominated."
; that π * i (X \A * ) = 1 when the inequality is reversed; and that π * i place positive mass only on the union of these two sets when equality holds.
[ Figure 1 about here.] Figure 1 , from Baron (1991) , gives a visual example of no-delay stationary equilibria, where n = 3, majority rule is used, X is the unit simplex in 3 , utility functions are quadratic with ideal points at the respective unit coordinate vectors, and ρ i = 1/3 and δ i = 1 for all i ∈ N . One mixed strategy equilibrium is given by π *
, and π * 3 (e) = π * 3 (f ) = 1/2, with acceptance sets given by the appropriate weak upper contour sets; other distributions over these six alternatives work as well. Indeed, one pure strategy equilibrium is π *
To state our additional restriction on preferences, define i's weak and strict upper contour sets at x, respectively, as
and define R C (x), P C (x), R(x), and P (x) following the conventions on acceptance sets. We say that limited shared weak preference (LSWP) holds if, for all C ⊆ N and all x ∈ X,
That is, if y (distinct from x) weakly dominates x from the perspective of a coalition C, it can be approximated by alternatives that strictly dominate x for C. In Appendix A, we present two general models in which LSWP holds. Special cases include the following familiar environments.
• Classical spatial model/Pure public goods. Each u i is strictly quasiconcave, as when there exists
. Or, if alternatives represent public goods, each u i may be monotonic as well. If a restriction on shared indifference is imposed, strict quasi-concavity may be dropped.
• Public decisions with transfers. X = Z × T , T ⊆ n , and each u i is quasi-linear: u i (z, t) = φ i (z) + t i , φ i strictly quasi-concave.
• Exchange economy. Alternatives are allocations of private goods, and each u i is strictly quasi-concave and strictly monotonic in i's consumption.
• Divide the dollar. X = ∆ and u i (x) = x i .
Though LSWP is satisfied in divide the dollar environments, it does not hold for general linear u i : for example, let n = 2, X the unit ball in
2
, where one agent has gradient (1, 0) and the other has gradient (−1, 0).
Existence
Theorem 1 (i) If δ i < 1 for all i ∈ N ,
then there exists a no-delay stationary equilibrium, and every stationary equilibrium is a no-delay equilibrium. (ii) If LSWP holds, then there exists a no-delay stationary equilibrium. (iii) If each u i is strictly quasi-concave, then every no-delay stationary equilibrium has finite support.
Proof:
By concavity of u i , by u i (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X, and by δ i ≤ 1, we have x(π) ∈ A i (π), and therefore A i (π) is non-empty. It is compact by the continuity of u i , and it is convex by the concavity of u i . For all C ∈ D, define A C (π) = i∈C A i (π), also non-empty, compact, and convex; and define A(π) = C∈D A C (π), which is non-empty and compact, but not necessarily convex. Theorem 7, in Appendix B, establishes that A is continuous as a correspondence on [P(X)]
By the Theorem of the Maximum (Aliprantis and Border, 1994, Theorem 14.30),
n →→ X has non-empty and compact values and is upper hemicontinuous; however, it is not necessarily convex-valued since A(π) is not necessarily convex. Let B i (π) = P(M i (π)) denote the set of mixtures of optimal proposals, which defines a non-empty, compact-and convexvalued, upper hemicontinuous correspondence (Aliprantis and Border, 1994, Theorem 14.14). Define the correspondence B:
n is compact and convex, by Glicksberg (1952) B has a fixed point, say π with acceptance sets A * i = A i (π * ), i = 1, . . . , n, constitutes an equilibrium. This completes the proof of (ii).
To complete the proof of (i), let σ * be a stationary equilibrium. In step (7) of the proof of Theorem 7, we prove the existence ofx ∈ X such that,
and sequential rationality requires π * i put probability one on arg
To prove (iii), let σ * be a no-delay stationary equilibrium. Each A * i is convex by strict quasi-concavity and weak dominance, and therefore each A * C is convex. Optimality of i's proposals requires that π * i put probability one on arg max{u i (y) | y ∈ A * }, which can be rewritten
By convexity of A * C and strict quasi-concavity of u i , arg max{u i (y) | y ∈ A * } is a singleton. Since D is finite, the result is proved.
A few remarks are in order. By definition, in no-delay equilibria the first proposal is always accepted, so there is no inefficiency due to delay. However, if agents' proposals differ and utility functions are strictly concave, there will be ex ante inefficiency due to uncertainty.
The definitions of Section 2 and the proof of Theorem 1 would require only notational changes if we generalized the voting rule to a collection {D i } i∈N , where D i is the non-empty, monotonic collection of coalitions that can pass a proposal from agent i. We would let A i = C∈D i A C consist of the proposals i can pass. In the proof, we would define A i (π) accordingly, and we would define
(π)}, restricting i's proposals to those the agent can pass; we again find a fixed point of the correspondence B, defined as before, giving us a no-delay stationary equilibrium.
The fixed points of B are all the stationary equilibrium proposals when each δ i < 1. Consider a stationary equilibrium with proposals given by profile π • and acceptance sets {A
In equilibrium, agent i must put probability one on the utility maximizing proposals in A
• , but it is conceivable that these proposals are not utility
}. In step (7) of the proof of Theorem 7, in Appendix B, we prove the existence ofx ∈ X such that
By choosing α > 0 low enough, i can pass a proposal arbitrarily close to x and, by continuity of u i , with utility arbitrarily close to u i (x ). Therefore, in equilibrium, π
In contrast, when δ i = 1 for some agents, there can exist stationary equilibria with delay: n = 2, unanimity, x ∈ X Pareto optimal for agents 1 and 2, y ∈ X such that u 2 (x) > u 2 (y), ρ 1 = 1. In each period agent 1 proposes x with probability 1/2, and y with probability 1/2; and agent 2 rejects any z ∈ X such that u 2 (z) < u 2 (x). Then since x is Pareto optimal x is the best 1 can do given 2's acceptance rule; and with probability one x is proposed in finite time, so i receives utility of u i (x).
Because the set A of socially acceptable proposals need not be convex, even in equilibrium (as in Figure 1 Proof: If D is a filter, then A(π), defined in the proof of Theorem 1, is just i∈K(D) A i (π), a convex set. Therefore, revising the argument there using only pure strategies, we find that M i (π) is convex-valued for all i ∈ N , so there exists a pure strategy stationary equilibrium.
We claim A(π) is also convex if d = 1. Let x = max A(π) and x = min A(π), which exist by compactness of X and continuity of the u i , and let C and C satisfy x ∈ A C (π) and x ∈ A C (π). Clearly x(π) ∈ [x, x] = convA(π) and, by concavity,
A symmetric argument addresses the case y ∈ [x(π), x ]. Therefore, the proof of Theorem 1, revised for pure strategies, establishes a pure strategy equilibrium.
If n = 2, then all proper voting rules are filters: either unanimity or dictatorship. Thus, from Theorem 2 we obtain the existence of pure strategy stationary equilibria for the case of two-agent bargaining under all proper voting rules.
Finally, the high degree of symmetry in the example of Figure 1 generates a multiplicity of equilibria, as Baron (1991) notes, but the equilibria are payoff equivalent. This raises the issue of uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs. While this property may hold in special environments, it does not hold generally: in Section 5, we give an example with each δ i = 1 in which equilibria are not payoff equivalent; and we will now show that non-unique equilibrium payoffs may occur even when the agents' discount rates are below one. Assume n = 3, majority rule, X the unit simplex in 
with A 2 and A 3 defined symmetrically. Proposal a gives agent 2 a payoff of exactly 12, 000, which is the minimum needed to acquire 2's approval. Thus, agent 1's strategy is a best response, as are 2's and 3's. 
with A 2 and A 3 defined symmetrically. Proposal a gives agent 2 a payoff of exactly 12, 100, which is the minimum needed to acquire 2's approval. Thus, agent 1's strategy is a best response, as are 2's and 3's, giving us a stationary equilibrium with continuation payoffs distinct from those in the preceding example.
Continuity
The equilibria identified in Theorem 1 are parametrized by the agents' recognition probabilities, ρ = (ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n ) ∈ ∆, and their discount factors,
To these we add information about their utility functions: let Λ ⊂ k be a set parameterizing profiles of utility functions, so that agent i's preferences can be represented as u i (x) = u i (x, λ) for some λ ∈ Λ. For instance, we could have Λ ⊆ nd , λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) ∈ Λ, each λ i representing the ideal point of a quadratic utility function for agent i; or more generally, λ i might be the matrix defining weighted Euclidean distance utilities (cf. Hinich and Munger, 1997); alternatively, preferences could be represented in a general separable form (cf. Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991)
where t h : X → for h = 1, 2, . . . , m + 1. Assume u i is jointly continuous; for all λ ∈ Λ, assume u i (·, λ) is concave and non-negative; moreover, assume there is some x ∈ X such that, for all j ∈ N , u j (x, λ) > 0. For parameters ρ, δ, and λ, let E(ρ, δ, λ) denote the set of no-delay stationary equilibrium proposals given by the fixed points of the correspondence B, defined in the proof of Theorem 1. As discussed in the previous section, when discount rates are less than one E(ρ, δ, λ) consists of all stationary equilibrium profiles of proposals; when some discount rates are equal to one, E may exclude some profiles that cannot be obtained as limits of equilibria as discount rates approach one. Proof: Given parameters ρ, δ, and λ satisfying the assumptions of the theorem and given a profile π of mixed stationary proposals, let θ denote the vector (ρ, δ, λ, π). Define
where v i (π, ρ, λ) is i's continuation value, defined as in Section 2 but using u i (·, λ). Theorem 7, in Appendix B, establishes that A is continuous as a correspondence at θ. Hence, by the Theorem of the Maximum,
is upper hemicontinuous at θ, and therefore so is B i (θ) ≡ P(M i (θ)). Since 
As applications, note that when δ i = 0 for all i ∈ N , the agents will propose their (unique, say) ideal points when recognized; by Theorem 3, therefore, when discount factors are all close to zero, each proposal will be close to the proposer's ideal point. Similarly, when ρ i = 1, as in the model of Romer and Rosenthal (1978a,b), we can easily solve for the equilibrium proposals for i; and when ρ i is close to one the agent's proposals will be close to that when ρ i equals one and hence the expected outcome will be close to the original. Finally, suppose all equilibrium proposals actually coincide at the point x * for some λ * ; then for all values of λ close to λ * all equilibrium proposals will be close to x * .
Core Equivalence
In this section, we asume throughout that each u i is strictly quasi-concave, so LSWP holds; ρ i > 0, implying that all agents have some chance of being recognized; and δ i = 1, implying that all agents are perfectly patient. In addition, we assume that D is proper. Let C(D) ⊆ X denote the set of core outcomes associated with the decisive coalitions D:
In what follows we will denote pure strategy profiles of proposals by p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ). Note that the next lemma requires strict quasi-concavity only for one direction. 
) for all i ∈ C. By weak dominance, y ∈ A * i for all i ∈ C, and hence y ∈ A * . Thus, when i ∈ C is the proposer she gets a strictly higher payoff from proposing y than she does from proposing x * , a contradiction.
Assume
The next lemma reveals a connection between the structure of the set of no-delay stationary equilibrium proposals and the structure of the voting rule. Say that D is a pre-filter (or is collegial) if K(D) = ∅, i.e., if at least one agent possesses a veto. Note that a filter is necessarily a pre-filter. ) has cardinality at least N (D). 8 For a "one parameter" example of the difference between pre-filters and filters, let n = 5, and consider a weighted q-rule with the following weights assigned to the agents:
1. The set of decisive coalitions is then D(q) = {C ⊆ N | i∈C w i ≥ q}, where q ranges from .5 to 1. For q ∈ [.65, .70] the rule is a filter, since a decisive coalition requires both large agents to be members, and these agents together constitute a decisive coalition. Similarly, for q ∈ (.90, 1] the rule is a filter, since the only decisive coalition is N . Finally, for q ∈ (.70, .90) the rule is a pre-filter, as the presence of the two large agents is necessary for a coalition to be decisive, but is not sufficient. When q ∈ (.5, .65) the rule is neither.
Proof: Suppose that S(π *
) has more than one extreme point yet the cardinality of the set of extreme points is less than N (D). From Theorem 1, strict quasi-concavity implies that S(π * ) is finite and, therefore, has a finite number of extreme points. Denumerate the set of extreme points of S(π * ) as x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m , and define
is a no-delay equilibrium, we have C h ∈ D for all h. Then, by definition of the Nakamura number, there is some j ∈ m h=1 C h . That is, there is some j such that x h ∈ A * j for all h. We claim that u j (x) = u j (y) for all x, y ∈ S(π * ). Otherwise,
and furthermore, by the Bauer Maximum Principle (Aliprantis and Border, 1994, Theorem 4.104), u is achieved at an extreme point of S(π * ), say x k . But, since δ j = 1, this means that j's acceptance set violates weak dominance:
, so in equilibrium we must have
This contradiction establishes the claim. Note that, by concavity of the
, strict quasi-concavity and the weak dominance condition on A * C 1
imply that the convex hull of {x 1 
. Then, because π * j is a best response proposal strategy for j, continuity of u j implies that there exists
By the Krein-Milman Theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 1994, Theorem 4.103), we know that x(π * ), since it is an element of the convex hull of S(π * ), can be written as a convex combination of the extreme points of S(π * ), which, we may suppose, places positive weight on the first h extreme points. Since S(π * ) contains more than one element, x(π * ) cannot itself be an extreme point, so h > 1. Then strict quasi-concavity and u j (
. In equilibrium, j must propose alternatives with utility at least u j (x * ) ≥ u j (x(π * )) > u j (x 1 ). But ρ j > 0, so j's proposals are elements of S(π * ), contradicting the claim that j's utility is constant on S(π * ). Nakamura (1979) introduces the concept of the Nakamura number in his analysis of core non-emptiness in the absence of convexity restrictions, while Schofield (1984) and Strnad (1985) assume convexity of X and impose a weak convexity condition on preferences: they prove that the core is non-empty if d ≤ N (D) − 2; and that, otherwise, there exist profiles of preferences for which the core is empty. As special cases, the core is non-empty if d = 1 (since N (D) ≥ 3) or if D is a pre-filter (since then N (D) = ∞). These two cases play analogous roles in the analysis of this section, providing sufficient structure for the existence of pure strategy stationary equilibria and equivalence with core outcomes.
If D is a pre-filter, so that N (D) is infinite, it is clear that the set of extreme points of S(π * ), a finite set, cannot exceed N (D). From Lemma 2, therefore, S(π * ) has at most one extreme point. Since it is finite, from part (ii) of Theorem 1, and non-empty, it has exactly one, say x * . From Lemma 1, therefore, we have x * ∈ C(D), giving us the following result.
Theorem 4 If D is a pre-filter, then all no-delay stationary equilibria are in pure strategies and are of the form
p * 1 = · · · = p * n = x * for some x *
∈ C(D).
Using Lemma 1, we have an equivalence between the core outcomes of the underlying voting rule and the equilibrium bargaining outcomes when agents are perfectly patient and the decisive coalitions D constitute a prefilter. Combine this with Theorems 2 and 3 when D is a filter: pure strategy equilibria exist for all discount factors; the equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core outcomes when discount factors all equal one; and the equilibrium outcomes converge to the core when these factors all converge to one.
If d = 1, the set of extreme points of S(π * ) has at most two elements. Since D is proper, however, N (D) ≥ 3, and from Lemma 2 we then know that S(π * ) has at most one extreme point. Again, because S(π * ) is finite and non-empty, we conclude that it has exactly one, say x * . From Lemma 1, therefore, we have x * ∈ C(D), giving us the following result. 
When the alternative space has but a single dimension and agents are perfectly patient, we again get an equivalence between the core outcomes of the underlying voting game and the equilibrium bargaining outcomes. Furthermore, by Theorems 2 and 3 we know that pure strategy equilibrium outcomes exist for all discount factors, and that they converge to core outcomes when discount factors converge to one. Now suppose in addition that the core of D is actually a singleton; then we can also conclude that, as the discount factors converge to one, all of the equilibrium bargaining proposals collapse down to a single point in the space. Therefore, even if there are multiple equilibria when discount factors are less than one, when these factors are close to one the equilibrium proposals will be close to one another. A sufficient condition for the core (when non-empty) to be a singleton, given our assumption of strictly quasi-concave utilities, is that D is strong:
Majority rule is an example of a strong rule when n is odd, so by Theorem 5 the current bargaining model replicates the predictions of the Median Voter Theorem (Black, 1958; Downs, 1957) , and so these two agents are indifferent between accepting and rejecting p 1 and thus accepting is a best response. A similar logic holds for proposals p 2 , p 3 and p 4 , thereby guaranteeing that each proposal can be accepted. Further, given the continuation values is it clear that these are utility-maximizing choices for the proposers. Thus, we have a stationary equilibrium away from the unique core outcome at (0, 0) (in fact, a continuum of them, parametrized by α).
The "problem" in this example is that the core is not associated with any one agent's ideal point and so is not offered as a proposal. To illustrate, suppose there is now a fifth agent with quadratic preferences and ideal point at (0, 0). Under majority rule the core remains at (0, 0); however now, as long as ρ 5 is strictly positive, this core point can have some influence on the agents' behavior. In particular, the above proposals for agents 1 through 4, along with p 5 = (0, 0), do not constitute an equilibrium, even with ρ 5 arbitrarily small (and the other recognition probabilities equal to, say, .25 − ρ 5 /4). To see this, note that the mean of the proposals has not changed; the variance has strictly decreased below α 2 , however, and by offering p 1 = (α, 0) agent 1 will acquire the votes of no other agent.
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The only equilibrium in this augmented example is, as in Theorems 4 and 5, at the core point. The next theorem subsumes this observation as a special case of a general result on quadratic preferences and strong voting rules. 
is decisive. Suppose the former, without loss of generality. Since x * ∈ intX, there exists > 0 such that x * + p ∈ X and for all members i,
) for all i ∈ N \ C; then concavity yields 10 Note that this example demonstrates a violation of lower hemicontinuity of E in ρ. Let x ∈ arg min{u 1 (x) | x ∈ S(π * )}, which is well-defined by Theorem 1, parts (i) and (ii). Suppose, in order to deduce a contradiction, that x = x * , i.e., |S(π * )| > 1.
is a total median; in particular, the coalition
is decisive: otherwise, by D strong, N \ D ∈ D; but because x * ∈ intX and the u i are quadratic, we could then take > 0 small enough that
: quadratic utility implies mean-variance analysis; letting v * denote the variance of π * , we have
where the first inequality follows from (7) and the second from (5). 
Because x is, by definition, proposed with positive probability, (9) contradicts our assumption that σ * is a no-delay equilibrium. Thus, we conclude that x = x * . Thus, under majority rule (n odd) and quadratic utilities, if the agents' ideal points satisfy the "Plott conditions" (Plott, 1967) and agents are perfectly patient, the unique equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game coincides with the majority rule core point. Furthermore, by Theorem 3, if we perturb the ideal points, the equilibrium proposals stay near to one another, as well as close to their original position. Just this sort of continuity has been witnessed experimentally: in Fiorina and Plott (1978) five-person, twodimensional experiments were run in which at times the utilities were such that a majority rule core existed, while at other times the required conditions were not quite satisfied. The experimental outcomes tended to cluster around the core in the former, and did not stray very far in the latter.
The assumption of quadratic utility functions allows us to use meanvariance analysis in the proof of Theorem 6. To see that the theorem does not generalize to all utility functions based on Euclidean distance, return to our earlier example: . Given the profile of proposal strategies where all agents propose their ideal points, the continuation values of the first four agents are −5, and the continuation value of agent 5, the core agent, is −.8. The utility to agents 2 and 4 from the proposal p 1 = (1, 0) is −4, which is greater than their continuation values, and accepting is a best response. A similar logic holds for the remaining proposals. Thus, we have a stationary equilibrium in which the unique core outcome occurs with probability one fifth.
Discussion
We have analyzed a non-cooperative model of multi-agent bargaining over a multidimensional alternative space, proving existence of stationary equilibria, and relating equilibrium outcomes to the core outcomes of the underlying voting game. While our bargaining model replicates the predictions of the core under certain conditions, it avoids the principle "negative" result of social choice theory, the instability of social choices when the core is empty. Furthermore, we establish a robustness property of equilibrium predictions, namely, that the set of outcomes does not "blow up" upon perturbation of parameters. Our existence result relies on the use of mixed strategies, a maneuver with an extensive pedigree in game theory. One can see this as an advantage of the non-cooperative approach in contrast to the cooperative, in that an accepted (or, at least, standard) way out of the existence problem is readily at hand. Alternatively, it should be noted that the necessity of allowing for mixed strategies is being driven here by our quest for stationary equilibria. If instead we only required equilibria that were (say) subgame perfect, then presumably the existence of such equilibria in pure strategies for finite-horizon versions of the game, along with a limiting argument, would have sufficed to generate a pure-strategy equilibrium existence result. In any event, we are able to prove existence of pure strategy stationary equilibria for the special cases of two-agent bargaining (common in economic models), for n-agent bargaining with unanimous consent, and for one-dimensional spaces of alternatives.
The current model implicitly assumes that each agent's utility from the (unseen) "status quo" alternative is zero, while alternatives in X give the agents non-negative utility; equivalently, everyone weakly prefers all the alternatives in X to the status quo. If we drop this assumption, the proof of part (i) of Theorem 1 no longer goes through, but we regain existence if (a) we explicitly specify the status quo, q, as an alternative in X; (b) we impose the requirement that the discount rates of the agents are identical, i.e., there exists some δ ∈ [0, 1] such that, for all i ∈ N , δ i = δ; and (c) we define agent i's payoff from outcome (x, t) as (1 − δ
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If we then assume u i (q) = 0 for all i ∈ N (now just a normalization), agent i's payoff from outcome (x, t) would be defined just as before. As a special case, we obtain the model of Romer and Rosenthal (1978a,b) , where d = 1, majority rule, ρ i = 1 for some i ∈ N (the "agenda setter") and δ 1 = · · · = δ n = 0. The core equivalence results are unaffected by the introduction of the status quo.
Once the status quo is explicitly brought into the model, an obvious but difficult extension would be to allow for bargaining to continue after passage of a proposal in period t, that proposal being the new status quo for period t+1, and so on. Baron (1996) characterizes the stationary equilibria of such a model when the set of alternatives is one-dimensional, and Baron and Herron (1998) investigate a finite horizon version of the model with three agents, twodimensional policy space, and quadratic utility functions. With the addition of this state variable, stationary strategies must be conditional on the status quo: proposal strategies would be mappings from X (possible status quo outcomes) to probability measures on X, and acceptance strategies would be correspondences from X to X. It may be possible to modify the techniques of this paper to the analysis of this complex but realistic setting, but that is a matter for future research.
We have taken recognition probabilities as exogeneously given, without offering an explanation of their possible origins. One interpretation, appropriate when bargaining takes place within a parliamentary or legislative body, is that the agents represent parties and that the recognition probability of a party represents the number of seats it holds, proxying for the party's influence in lawmaking. An interesting extension would be to explicitly model the voters who elect the members of parliament, providing an alternative to Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Coate (1997) , Schofield (1998) , Schofield and Sened (1998) , and Baron and Diermeier (1998) .
While we have investigated a model of bargaining, other types of institutional structures have been modelled non-cooperatively to obtain equilibrium existence in the absence of core outcomes. These approaches include sophisticated voting under various types of agendas; 12 mixed strategy equilibria in two-party spatial competition games; 13 and the "structure-induced equilibrium" model of committees (Shepsle, 1979) , in which each committee is assigned to a dimension of the alternative space and is given sole jurisdiction over the location of the policy along that dimension. In contrast, to the latter approach, our bargaining model might be thought of as a model of legislatures in the absence of a formal committee system, providing a useful benchmark against which a general model of institutional choice might be constructed, and offering a prediction in situations where no such institutional arrangements are to be found. An important question is then the extent to which our model gives different predictions for the same underlying preferences, and how well these predictions square with empirical observations. An alternative within the cooperative paradigm is to consider solutions other than the core or top cycle set. Numerous alternative solution concepts have been suggested, such as the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) , the bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler, 1964) , the competitive solution (McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer, 1978), the uncovered set (Miller, 1980; McKelvey, 1986; Cox, 1987) , and the heart (Schofield, 1996 (Schofield, , 1998 . A question we have not addressed in this paper is the relationship between the equilibrium outcomes of our non-cooperative bargaining model and the above solutions, but the results of Section 5 do inform us that assuming unanimity rule and setting discount rates equal to one in our model does not yield the Nash bargaining solution (or any other selection from the Pareto optimals): by Lemma 1, every Pareto optimal alternative could be supported as a stationary equilibrium outcome for this specification of the model. It may be, however, that equilibrium outcomes do converge to the Nash solution as discount rates increase to one, giving us a robust selection from the limit equilibrium outcomes.
A Limited Shared Weak Preference
In the subsections below, we construct two general models in which the LSWP restriction holds: one in which limited forms of strict quasi-concavity and monotonicity (satisfied in most economic models) are imposed, another in which a limitation on shared indifference is imposed. In both cases, we will take arbitrary C ⊆ N and x ∈ X such that |R C (x)| > 1. For any x ∈ R C (x), we must then construct a sequence in P C (x) converging to x . We note here that, since |R C (x)| > 1, we can take x ∈ R C (x) distinct from x . = (z, w, t), x = (z , w , t ) , and so on. Here, l represents a number of public goods, k represents a number of private goods, and elements of T represent allocations of an additional private good (distinguished notationally to facilitate the analysis when preferences are quasi-linear). Let w(i) denote the components of w representing i's consumption of the first k private goods. To the assumptions on X in Section 2, we add transferability of private goods: given x ∈ X and x ≥ 0, if z = z,
A.1 Economic Environments
In addition to continuity, we assume that u i is strictly monotonic in private goods, and we assume u i is quasi-concave, strictly so in the public good and strictly so in i's consumption of the first k private goods. Formally, our monotonicity assumption is that, for all x, x ∈ X with z = z if (w(i), t i ) ≥ (w (i), t i ) with strict inequality in at least one component, then u i (x) > u i (x ). Our convexity assumption is that, for all x, x ∈ X and all α ∈ (0, 1),
. These assumptions generalize many economic models: setting k = 0 and noting that we do not require strict quasi-concavity in t, we encompass the standard quasi-linear model of public decisions with transfers; setting l = 0 and T = {0}, we encompass private good exchange economies; setting k = 0 and T = {0}, we have a pure public good economy with strictly convex preferences (this case is also treated in the next subsection); or setting l = k = 0, we can obtain the divide the dollar model. In fact, because we do not require monotonicity in the public goods, we allow for the possibility of public bads or, generalizing the classical spatial model, for ideal (or "satiation") points. Now take C, x , and x as at the beginning of the section, and definê
x . By quasi-concavity, we havex ∈ R C (x). We consider four cases. First, if z = z , we havex ∈ P C (x) by our convexity assumption. That assumption also yields 1 mx
for all non-negative integers m. Letting m go to infinity, we have the desired sequence.
Second, if z = z and w (i) = w (i) for some i ∈ C, then, by our convexity assumption, u i (x) > min{u i (x ), u i (x )} ≥ u i (x). Since w (i) = w (i), it follows thatŵ(i) is non-zero in some component, say the hth. Definex ∈ X fromx by taking a small enough amount, say > 0, of the hth good and distributing it to the other members of C. By continuity, we can take small enough that u i (x) > u i (x). By strict monotonicity in private goods, we havex ∈ P C (x). That assumption also yields 1 mx
Third, suppose z = z , w (i) = w (i) for all i ∈ C, and t i = t i for some i ∈ C. Without loss of generality, suppose t i > t i . By strict monotonicity,
. Thus, following the argument of the second case, we can definex ∈ P C (x) fromx by distributing a small enough amount of the distinguished private good from i to the other members of C. The desired sequence is defined as in the second case.
Fourth, suppose z = z , w (i) = w (i) for all i ∈ C, and t i = t i for all i ∈ C. Since x = x , there is some j / ∈ C such that (w (j), t j ) = 0 or (w (j), t j ) = 0. Therefore, (ŵ(j),t j ) = 0, and we can definex ∈ P C (x) fromx by taking a small enough amount of some private good from j and distributing it to the members of C. The desired sequence is defined in the now familiar way.
A.2 Limited Shared Indifference
Assume now, as in Section 2, only that X is compact and convex. As a special case of the last subsection, we know that strict quasi-concavity is sufficient for the condition of interest. In this subsection, we drop strict quasi-concavity by imposing, along with two other weak conditions, a condition limiting the extent to which agents may share indifference. Let I i (x) = {y ∈ X | u i (y) = u i (x)}. In addition to continuity and concavity, 14 we impose three conditions on the agents' utility functions: for all x ∈ X,
14 In this subsection, a condition weaker than concavity is sufficient for our arguments. It is called "semistrict quasiconcavity" by Aliprantis and Border (1994, p.175) : for all x, y ∈ X and all α ∈ (0, 1),
Condition (i) is the requirement that the agents' indifference curves be "thin." Condition (ii) requires that an agent has at most one ideal point. Condition (iii) limits the extent of shared indifference and is satisfied if each u i is strictly quasi-concave. Moreover, it is enough that u i be strictly quasiconcave for n − 1 agents. If X is a subset of 2 , the condition is also satisfied when the agents' utility functions are linear with pairwise linearly independent gradients.
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Take C, x , and x as at the beginning of the section. Use condition (iii) to findx in the line segment [
for no i ∈ C, then it follows thatx ∈ P C (x). By concavity,
Suppose u i (x) = u i (x ) for one i ∈ C. By continuity, there exists an open set G containingx such that G ⊆ P j (x) for all members j = i of C. Sincex = x , it follows from condition (ii) that P i (x) = ∅. Then condition (i) implies thatx ∈ R i (x) = P i (x), so there existsx ∈ G ∩ P i (x) ⊆ P C (x). Again, we use concavity to construct the desired sequence.
B Continuity of Acceptance Correspondences
As in Section 4, let ρ = (ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n ) ∈ ∆ and δ = (δ 1 , . . . , δ n ) ∈ [0, 1] n be the profiles of agents' recognition probabilities and discount rates. Index profiles of utility functions by λ ∈ Λ ⊆ k , and assume each u i (·, λ) is concave and non-negative; moreover, assume there is some x ∈ X such that, for all j ∈ N , u j (x, λ) > 0. Lastly, assume each u i is jointly continuous. where v i is defined as in Section 2 but using u i (·, λ). Define the correspondence A i : Θ →→ X by A i (θ) = {x ∈ X | u i (x, λ) ≥ r i (θ)}, 15 The example at the end of Section 2 illustrates the role of the linear independence condition.
and let A C (θ) = i∈C A i (θ) and A(θ) = C∈D A C (θ). We can now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 7 A has non-empty, compact values. If either δ i < 1 for all i ∈ N or LSWP holds at θ, then A is continuous at θ.
Proof:
The proof proceeds in a series of steps.
(1) A C has non-empty values: by concavity and non-negativity of u i (·, λ) and δ i ≤ 1, it follows that u i (x(π), λ) ≥ r i (θ); therefore, x(π) ∈ A C (θ).
(2) A C is compact-valued: follows from the continuity of u i (·, λ), the compactness of X, and the fact that compactness of the A i (θ) sets is preserved by intersections and (finite) unions. (6) and (7), it follows that A C is lower hemicontinuous at θ (see Lemma 14.21 in Aliprantis and Border (1994)). We can now complete the proof. That A has non-empty, compact values follows from (1), (2) , and the arbitrary choice of C. If δ i < 1 for all i ∈ N , then continuity of A C at θ follows from (4) and (8); continuity of A at θ then follows from Theorem 14.26 in Aliprantis and Border (1994) . If LSWP holds at θ, continuity of A C at θ follows from (4) and (10) , and continuity of A at θ again follows.
